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The most used techniques to ensure safety and reliability of the systems are applied together 
as a whole, and in most cases, the software components are usually overlooked or to little an-
alyzed. The present paper describes the applicability of fault trees analysis software system, 
analysis defined as Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA), fault trees are evaluated using bi-
nary decision diagrams, all of these being integrated and used with help from Java library re-
liability. 
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Introduction 
Safety critical software systems refer to 
those systems blackouts that may cause cata-
strophic consequences, implying human and 
substantial material losses [10]. A variety of 
techniques is available and used to ensure 
safety and reliability to the system. Some of 
those include: HAZOP method (Hazard and 
Operability Analysis), which deals with risk 
study and system operability; fault tree anal-
ysis (FTA), used to analyze potential danger 
causes and FME(C)A technique (Failure 
Modes Effects (and Criticality) Analysis ), 
used to check the proper system functionali-
ty.  
Most of the techniques mentioned before, are 
applied together as a whole, and in most cas-
es, the software components are usual over-
looked or very little analyzed.      
This paper describes an integrated framework 
for software reliability analysis using the fol-
lowing analyses and modeling techniques:  
-  software fault tree analysis (SFTA); 
-  binary decision diagram; 
-  Java technology for reliability. 
In use of this analysis framework are fal-
lowed these steps: 
-  it starts from a structural/functional anal-
ysis of the software system, in order to 
determine software’s failure mechanisms 
(failures), based on which the fault tree is 
constructed. The program is seen from a 
structural point of view, taking in consid-
eration his components and the relations 
between them; 
-  after the structural - functional analysis is 
made, the primary events group (primary 
defects) and the group of critical events 
(failures) are identified, with the help of 
which the fault tree is built; 
-  using the resulted tree, different computa-
tion operations are made, such us tree 
minimization, through known methods, 
to ease the implementation process using 
the Java language; 
-  for the automated decision binary dia-
gram generation an open source Java li-
brary is used, called JReliability (Java-
based Reliability Library), library devel-
oped for modeling and analyzing the reli-
ability of complex systems using BDD. 
Thus the most of the research was made 
on hardware systems in this paper the au-
thors extends the library utility towards 
software systems; 
-  at last, after the BDD generation a quanti-
tative analysis is made in order to evalu-
ate the reliability indicators put at dispos-
al by the JReliability, through the analytic 
results and through graphic representa-
tions.    
First are presented the techniques used until 
the present and well researched in the field’s 
literature: software fall tree analysis, SFTA 
and binary decision diagrams, BDD.  
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2 Combinatorial Models 
Combinatorial models represents a structured 
approach of systems, forming a class of reli-
ability models in which the causes of soft-
ware failure can be expressed in terms of 
combinations of software components (mod-
ules) faults (failures) [4]. Combinatorial 
models include models with graphs used in 
network reliability analysis, fault trees and 
reliability block diagrams. These models do 
not require the fulfillment of constant failure 
rate assumption and have been successfully 
applied for reliability analysis of mechanical 
and electrical systems. In particular, failure 
trees were implemented also for reliability 
software analysis. 
An alternative to SFTA [1] (a traditional ap-
proach of models with solutions based on 
minimal cuts) uses the so called binary deci-
sion diagrams (BDD) [2]. Binary decision di-
agram were used initial as a checking tech-
nique in electric circuit theory, but recently 
were adapted to resolve a failure tree model 
for quantitative and qualitative reliability 
analysis [12]. Because it seems that there is 
no connection between the number of mod-
ules (components) from a system and the di-
mension of the appropriate BDD, the BDD 
based solutions can offer efficient solutions 
techniques for big systems. 
 
2.1. Failure Trees  
An often used technique proven to be effi-
cient for the software reliability analysis is 
the software failure tree analysis (SFTA). 
This technique borrows the failure trees con-
cept (FTA) from the hardware field.   
FTA technique represents a deductive ap-
proach, having the system failure mechanism 
as a base [17]. FTA starts with an unwanted 
event, such as “obtaining unauthorized ac-
cess on a server”, and then determines (de-
ducts) its causes using a backward systematic 
process, step by step. To determine the caus-
es, a failure tree is built as a logical represen-
tation of events and the relations between 
them, which are necessary and sufficient to 
detect the unwanted event, called the top tree 
event (top event).  
Failure tree represents a qualitative model 
which provides a useful set of information 
about the causes which led to the manifesta-
tions of the unwanted event - called the criti-
cal event. Also, the tree can be quantitative 
evaluated to offer useful information about 
the probability of the top tree event to be 
produced, as well as the defects’ importance 
and the interdependence between them, mod-
eled in the failure tree. 
Itself the failure tree represents a graphic 
model of various parallel and sequential fail-
ures combinations, combinations which lead 
towards the manifestations of the predefined 
unwanted event. The defects can be events 
assigned to hardware components failures, 
human errors, software errors or any other 
event which can lead to the manifestation of 
the critical event. Thus, the tree describes the 
logical interdependency between the primary 
events (failures) resulting in the production 
of the top tree event.  
It is important to understand that a failure 
tree is not a model which describes all possi-
ble system failures or all possible causes of 
its failure. A tree is built around a critical 
event depending on its particular failure 
mechanism, and the tree will contain only 
those events (failures) which contribute on 
making the tree top event possible. More, 
those defects are not exhaustive; they cover 
only the failures evaluated to be realistic by 
the analysts.   
Also, it is also know that a fault tree is not by 
itself a quantitative model, but represents a 
qualitative model which can be evaluated 
even from a quantitative point of view.  
The result of the failure tree is a binary event, 
i.e. either towards success or towards failure. 
The graphic model of the tree is compound 
from an entities’ complex called “gates” 
which serve to allow or to deny the logic path 
towards the top event. The gates point to the 
necessary relations for producing a “superi-
or” event. The symbol of a gate indicates the 
relation type between the input methods nec-
essary for producing the output event.  
In Figure 1 is represented an example of fail-
ure tree. 
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Fig. 1. Simplified example of failure tree  
 
2.1.1 Software failure tree analysis (SFTA) 
Software failure tree analysis technique rep-
resents a method of identification and docu-
mentation of inferior level software events 
which allows to an event on a superior level 
(root node) to manifest. If the root event is a 
critic one, the FTA technique helps the re-
quests’ defining process, describing the ways 
in which the system can reach that uncertain 
state [8].   
To analyze the software reliability using the 
SFTA technique, first we must define the 
unwanted event as a root event. All the root 
events define the set of root events. Each root 
event has its own failure tree. Using logic re-
lations between program modules we can an-
alyze which modules or complex events 
(middle events) can cause the manifestation 
of the root event. The complex events analy-
sis is continued until a stopping condition it 
reached, more exactly on a primary (failed) 
event. So, based on this analysis it can be 
represented the software failure tree.   
A set of cuts represents a group of primary 
events (failures) whose manifestations lead to 
the falling of the system [11]. A set of cuts is 
called a minimal set of cuts only when they 
cannot be reduced and can cause the system 
failure. The minimal set of cuts provides a 
minimal set of successful events required to 
satisfy the root node. To obtain a set of min-
imal cuts, we use an algorithm “top-down”, 
more precise the Fussell - Vesely algorithm 
[3]:   
1)  Down from the root event, events are 
listed taking in consideration the various 
logical relationships between them. 
2)  If the gate underneath the root node is an 
OR logical gate, input events are showed 
on different rows. Even if it is a logical 
gate the input events are showed on a 
single row. 
3)  Taking in consideration the complex 
event, , it is also treated as a root event 
(same as the step 1) and the step 2 is re-
peated until the primary (failure) event it 
is reached.   
4)  Finally, a few sets of events are obtained 
representing all the cutting sets for the 
failure tree.  
5)  To obtain the minimal cut set from all 
those cuts obtained on 4
th step the next 
operations are made: first of all the cuts 
are arranged depending of their number 
of events where every cut is been viewed 
as a product of primary events. Then the 
fallowing relations are used to absorb the 
redundant cuts. Finally, the minimal cut 
set it’s obtained.      
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the graph for obtaining all the 
minimal cuts form the failure tree from figure 
1. Minimal cut set is composed from {A,B} 
and {A,C}     
 
Fig. 2. Minimal Cuts Generation  
 
It’s been also showed that the SFTA tech-
nique can be realized on different levels and 
steps of the software developing process. The 
highest analyze level it’s represented by the 
functional description. On the lowest level of 
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investigation, the SFTA technique analyzes 
the source code of the program. In this paper, 
it is used the SFTA methodology on the 
functional modules level, in order to analyze 
the reliability relations and the intrinsic’ re-
quests of the system modules.  
In this paper, taking in consideration a soft-
ware system, the modules (components) are 
viewed as primary events, and the root node 
is associated with the system failure event. 
Then, resorting to SFTA technique, we can 
find out which are the important modules to 
which a higher reliability and security can be 
allocated, being more likely to lead the sys-
tem to failure, if they are unreliable.   
 
2.1.2 Using the SFTA technique for soft-
ware reliability allocation [7] 
It is consider P as being the maxim failure 
probability accepted and the software system 
is composed from n modules: m1, m2, …., mn. 
Using the SFTA technique will obtain a 
number  x  of minimal cuts, after which the 
fallowing algorithm is applied.  
Algorithm 1: if a minimal cut contain a 
number of i modules, then the probability of 
failure of each module from the cut it’s been 
given by the relation:  
 
i
m x
P
P
j
/ 1





 ≤  , (j = 1,2, ... ,n)  (1) 
  
If there are intersections in the minimal cut 
set, the failure probabilities   can have k 
different values, noted with . 
Case in which can define  
 
j m P  = min( k y y y ,..., , 2 1 )  (2) 
 
It must be mentioned that the algorithm use 
the geometric mean, in a certain way [7], the 
process being a reversed one regarding the 
classical analysis of system unavailability us-
ing SFTA [9,pp 619 - 627]. Using the classic 
method, by giving the failure probabilities to 
each module (data gather in the testing step), 
we can find out the failure probability of the 
entire system. The methodology used here, 
represents the reversed method [7]: knowing 
the reliability’ request of the software sys-
tem, from the planning or designing phase, 
the reliability of each module it’s been inves-
tigated and determined, along with interde-
pendency between modules.  
According to the present algorithm, the prob-
abilities   are obtained by applying the 
geometric mean which can have unimportant 
small errors. So, we can offer, to software 
engineers, a comprehensive understanding 
regarding the structure of the software sys-
tem and the reliability request of each mod-
ule; information which can help to determine 
the most important modules (key modules), 
allocating a higher reliability to the last ones. 
 
Example 1: 
For the practical explanation of the algo-
rithm, the failure tree from Fig. 3 is exam-
ined for a software system made from six 
module m1, m2, …, m6 .  
 
 
Fig. 3. An example of failure tree  
  
The requirement is that the probability of the 
system failure to be . In which way 
the reliability must be allocated for each 
module? 
Using Fussel-Veseley [3] algorithm, all the 
cuts are first obtained in Fig. 4, for the tree 
from fig. 3. So, the generated cuts are:  
, , 
 and   
j m P
12 , ,..., k y yy
j m P
0,03 P ≤
13 {} Km = 21 2 {, } Km m =
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But,  , with other 
words   it’s subset from  , finally ob-
taining the minimal cuts:  ,   , 
. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Generating the minimal cuts for the tree from Figure 3 
  
Then, appling the 1
st relation, the fallowing 
results are obtained: 
  
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
(5) 
 
In other words, the maximum failure proba-
bility of each module is:  
(0.1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.215, 0.215, 0.215) 
 
So that the reliability of modules must be  
 
(0.9, 0.9, 0.99, 0.785, 0.785, 0.785). 
 
Based on the minimal cut definition and the 
analysis made above can reach an important 
conclusion: if the number of modules from a 
cut is low, then for those modules the highest 
reliability must be allocated.  
In example 1, because the number of mod-
ules from the minimal cut set follows the re-
lation K1 < K2 < K3, the fallowing conclu-
sion is asserted: m3 is the key module, mean-
ing that is the most important component 
from the system, thus must receive the most 
reliability, and the m4, m5, m6   modules can 
receive a lower reliability than m3. 
 
2.2 Binary decision diagrams  
The concept of binary decision diagram 
(BDD) was used, in the beginning, in the de-
sign and verification of VSSI (very large 
scale integration), as being an efficient meth-
od for the manipulation of Boolean expres-
sions [14,9]. Bryant [2] and other researchers 
showed that, in most cases, the BDD tech-
nique use less memory to represent large 
Boolean expressions, instead of the common 
representation.   
The binary decision diagrams are based on 
the Shannon decomposition, which makes 
the reliability evaluation to be accomplished 
very easy from the BDD form. A series of re-
searchers successfully used this method in 
the reliability analysis of the failure trees [11, 
15, 15 and 7]. 
The methodology presented in this papers it’s 
based on the analysis of failure trees using 
binary decision diagram. Besides the tech-
nique already presented in the field’s litera-
ture, the technique presented in this paper 
goes one step further, integrating this tech-
nology with the Java advanced programming 
techniques and technologies, used to auto-
mate the generation of failure trees and the 
generation of some reliability graphic indica-
tors.  
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2.2.1 Shannon Decomposition in ITE (If – 
Then - Else) 
Shannon decomposition theorem (or the de-
veloping theorem) is presented as fallowing: 
 is a function that represents a Boolean 
expression defined on the X set, and . 
According with the theorem, the relation 
could be written as:    
 
  (6) 
 
where    is evaluated in    and get not-
ed with   . 
Shannon decomposition is behind the use of 
binary decision diagram. To precise describe 
this theorem, it’s defined as If-Then-Else 
(ITE) as fallowing:   
 
  (7) 
 
where   and   . 
A BDD diagram represents a directed acyclic 
graph which has the Shannon decomposition 
at its base. The graph has a single root node 
and two terminal node, noted with 0 and 1, 
representing the two constant expresions. 
Each complex node is noted with a x boolean 
variable and has two exit branches. These 
two branches are called 0-branch (else 
branch) and 1-branch (then branch). The 
node connected with the 1-branch represents 
a boolean expresion when   , i.e.,   
from the equation (6), while any node con-
nected to a 0-branch indicates a Boolean ex-
pressions when x = 0, meaning   in 
equation 6. In fact, each complex node from 
BDD encrypts if-the-else instructions.     
An ordered binary decision diagram (OBDD) 
fallows the rule thrugh which the variables 
(nodes) are ordered, and the chart depth 
crossing is done in an ascending order 
following the nodes order. An reduced and 
ordered binary decision diagram (ROBDD) is 
a OBDD diagram in which each node 
represents a different boolean expresion.  
In practice, ROBDD diagrams are often used. 
To be able to generate a ROBDD diagram, 
first we must ordonate the variables, and this 
order must remain the same during the   
diagram generation process. In this paper, we 
note with    in case in which the 
variable is behind the   variable, in the or-
dered node list.   
Figure 5, describes two examples of ROBDD 
diagram generated for two different boolean 
expresion.  
Appling the equation (7), the ite forms of the 
g and h expressions are: 
 
  (8) 
  (9) 
  
 
(a)                 (b) 
 
Fig. 5. BDD examples for two Boolean ex-
pressions  
 
In practice it’s been shown that the BDD are 
generated using rather logical operations on 
the variables instead of applying directly the 
Shannon development.  
 
2.3 Quantitative Analysis  
Quantitative analysis is performed on the bi-
nary decision diagram (BDD) [12] represent-
ing an exact and efficient method allowing us 
to determine many reliability characteristics 
of a hardware/software system.   
Furthermore we will refer to methods which 
use the BDD’s containing complex or/and 
f
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modular events. The analysis purpose [2] is 
that to obtain probability of the critic event 
and the intensity of unconditioned failure.  
 
2.3.1 System Unavailability 
The probability of the critical events mani-
festation, noted with Qsys it’s obtained 
through the sum of probabilities obtained on 
disjoint branches from crossing the primary 
BDD diagram. An algorithm of depth cross-
ing (depth first) can effectively perform this 
calculation; in paper [15] an elaborate de-
scription of this method is presented.      
To make this calculation we need to know 
the unavailability of each coded event. For 
this, the probability of complex events and of 
modular ones must be obtained from the pri-
mary events data obtained experimental.  
The determination of unavailability complex 
events is straightforward, these events being 
a combination of two component events. The 
calculation depends on how events are com-
bined, under a “AND” logic gate or under a 
“OR” gate, thus, if xc is a complex event and 
its constituent events are x1 and x2 , then fal-
lowing will exists:  
logic gate  “AND”  :    (10) 
logic gate  “OR”:    (11) 
 
where: qc is the probability of achieving the 
complex event, and q1 and q2 are the proba-
bilities of realization of x1 and x2 events.  
The probabilities of complex events are cal-
culated according to their construction, mak-
ing the process more efficient.  
The calculation of modular events probabili-
ties it’s made by determining the probabili-
ties of the “top tree event” manifestation for 
each separate module. Also, in this case 
depth crossing algorithm is used. Thereby, 
first the unavailability of those modules must 
be evaluated, which encrypts only the prima-
ry and complex events.  
After the probabilities of the complex events 
were obtained along with those of the modu-
lar ones, the system unavailability can be 
easily determined.  
 
2.3.2 Unconditioned Failure Intensity of 
the System 
Unconditioned failure intensity of the system 
(called the system failure frequency) Wsys(t), 
is defined as the probability with which the 
critic event (root node) manifest itself at the t 
moment and it’s calculate using the fallowing 
relation:  
 
 
(12) 
 
where   Gi(q(t))  it’s the critically function (or 
the risk function associated to each failure 
node) for each component, and wi(t) repre-
sents the unconditioned failure intensity of 
one component.  
Explicitly, the risk function is defined as the 
system probability to be in a critical state, in 
relation with the component i and, so, failure 
of this component would make the system to 
pass from a functionality state to a failure 
one. So, it’s result the relation:  
 
(13)
 
where: Q(1i,q(t))is the probability of system 
failure with  qi(t)=1, and Q(0i,q(t)) is the 
probability of system failure with qi(t)=0.   
An efficient method for calculating criticality 
takes in consideration the probability of dia-
gram branches before and after the respective 
nodes, leading to the fallowing expression:  
 
(14) 
 
where:   - is the branch probability 
which leaves from the root node towards the 
xi node,    - the path probability on 
branch ‘1’ of the node xi towards terminal 
node 1, 
12 c qq q =⋅
121 2 c qqqq q =+−⋅
() () () () sys i i
i
wt G q tw t =⋅ 
()( )( ) () 1, () 0, () iii Gq t Q q t Q q t =−
() () () ()
10 () () () ()
iii ix x x
n
G q t p rq t p oq t p oq t   =⋅ −   
() ()
i x prq t
()
1 ()
i x poq t66   Informatica Economică vol. 16, no. 3/2012 
 -  the path probability on branch 
‘0’ of node xi towards the terminal node 1, 
and 
 -  all nodes corresponding to variable xi 
from DDB. 
For a single BDD, which codes only the pri-
mary events is necessary a single crossing of 
diagram in order to calculate ,   
and  for each node, from where it can 
be obtained the risk function of each primary 
event, leading to the unconditioned failure in-
tensity evaluation of the system.  
However, this method doesn’t take in consid-
eration the modular and complex events. It is 
possible the calculation of Wsys taking in con-
sideration only the primary events coded in 
the primary diagram, but this presumes the 
knowledge of both the risk of modular and 
complex events and the intensities of uncon-
ditioned failures. Even if these are not hard to 
gather, they represent some values which 
don’t present any utility in the performed 
analysis. Rather than those the risk functions 
of the primary events will be calculated 
which will be used together with their un-
conditioned failures intensities to determine 
Wsys  . 
These risk functions of primary events, from 
the primary BDD diagram, can be also calcu-
lated while obtaining the path probabilities 
for the primary diagram nodes.  
 
3 Using Java Language in Software Relia-
bility Analysis  
Within the methodology for integration of 
more reliability techniques in a global 
framework it’s been included a Java library, 
with the help of which it can be generated a 
binary decision diagram (BDD) and different 
reliability indicators can be evaluated for a 
considered software system   
JReliability represents a library written in Ja-
va programming language which has as pur-
pose the reliability evaluation of a system 
and have been developed in the Hard-
ware/Software Co-Design Department of the 
Computer Science Faculty from Erlangen-
Nuremberg University from Germany, [18]. 
The library is adapted (but not limited to) 
modeling and analysis based on BDD of 
complex systems, such us network integrated 
systems. Till now various materials have 
been published at internationals conferences, 
researches based on analysis and modeling 
for this library [4, 9, 11].  
This paper extends the JReliability library 
utilization in order to analyze the system 
software reliability.     
JReliability library is based on previous de-
veloped libraries, such as: JavaBDD - a Java 
library for binary decision diagram manipula-
tion; Ptolemy Plot (java library for plotters). 
JReliability allows gathering reliability indi-
cators, such as MTTF, or mission time (MT) 
of complex systems which are used using 
Boolean functions, efficient represented 
through binary decision diagrams.   
The library is very extensible so various spe-
cial evaluators for gathering others reliability 
indicators can be included along with design-
ing other system representation.   
More, JReliability offers a graphic user inter-
face (GUI) to visualize the obtained reliabil-
ity indicators, also the possibility to view the 
Boolean representation of the system (the 
BDD), using DOT graphic language. Figure 
6 presents the result of reliability evaluation 
for the failure – tolerant structure of TMR 
(Triple-Modular-Redundancy) type.  
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Fig. 6. Analysis of the TMR reliability structure using JReliability 
 
3.1 Operation of JReliability 
The idea which underlines the use of JRelia-
bility library is that there is a Model of the 
system which describes the system behavior 
in the case of failure manifestation, failures 
or repairs of the system component. Having 
this Model it can generate the overall Relia-
bility Function. In the last step, a set of eval-
uators will obtain reliability indicators, based 
on the Model and Reliability Function or, if 
possible, only on the Reliability Function. 
The principle is schematically described in 
Figure 7.   
 
 
Fig. 7. Functional principle of JReliability 
 
3.2 Reliability Modeling with JReliability 
The behavior of a system (failure mecha-
nism) is usually represented by failure trees, 
reliability block diagrams (RBD), automated, 
Markov chains or Boolean functions. All of 
this techniques have in common the fact that 
exist, implicitly or explicitly, a data structure 
which can observe if the system function 
properly, to a certain point, or if is unavaila-
ble, i.e. doesn’t work properly.  
JReliability uses a Boolean function to repre-
sent system structural function; function en-
crypted with binary decision diagrams 
(BDDs)  
To obtain the Reliability Function of the 
whole system, it must be known the Reliabil-
ity Function of each component from the sys-
tem. For this purpose, JReliability is using a 
data structure called Transformer Function, 
which represents mapping of each element 
(component) corresponding to his own Reli-
ability Function.  JReliability comes with a 
wide set of Reliability Function known and 
predefined, based on exponential distribu-
tions, Weibull distributions and many others.  
Having this knowledge, JReliability structure 
can be refined like in the Figure 8. 
Note that the BDD which encrypts the Bool-
ean functions combined with the Transform-
er Function represents an approach to obtain 
the global Reliability Function. The user can 
implement other methods which will lead to 
expanding the use of JReliability library. 
Model 
results
uses
Reliability 
Function 
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3.3 Reliability Evaluation  
Once the global Reliability Function of the 
system has been obtain, it can evaluate dif-
ferent reliability indicators such us:  average 
lifetime until the failure – MTTF, mission 
timing – MT, failure rate, etc., using the so 
called Evaluators. An evaluator receive from 
input a Reliability Function and evaluate the 
wanted indicator either analytic, either by 
gathering evidence or simulating.   
Some Evaluators requires, also, the access to 
Reliability Function of each component from 
the system and to structure Boolean functions 
of whole system, encrypted in BDD. To 
reach this purpose, was developed a special 
Reliability Function, called BDD Reliability 
Function, which offers the access to Reliabil-
ity Function of each component, and to 
whole BDD.  
 
 
Fig. 8. JReliability extended structure Model 
= {BDD, TransformerFunction} 
 
3.4. Binary decision diagrams role in JRe-
liability 
The basic model of system behavior, current 
in JReliability, is the Boolean function. Data 
structure used to efficient encrypt this kind of 
functions in JReliability is been given by bi-
nary decision diagrams. An important char-
acteristic of the JReliability library is that it 
offers a generic special interface for a series 
of BDD libraries, which allows directly using 
BDD variables of Java objects to model 
components of the real system  
BDD allows canonic representation of Bool-
ean functions. BDD represents an acyclic di-
rection graph with root and is made from de-
cision nodes, which corresponds to variables 
and two terminal nodes, 0 and 1, which cor-
responds to returned value of Boolean func-
tion. Since each is a binary variable which 
can make only 0 and 1 value, each decision 
node presents two output ramifications, low 
and high, corresponding the case in which 
the variable take 0 and 1 values. This process 
is presented in fig. 9. Any values attribution 
for variables which lead to terminal node 1 
corresponds of a functional system, while 
any attribution of values for variables which 
lead to terminal node 0, corresponding to a 
system in a failure state.  
 
 
Fig. 9. BDD data tip structure example  
 
In this reliability library, each variable corre-
sponds to one component, being represented 
by a Java object. Value 0 corresponds to a 
failed component and value 1 to a component 
in a good state of functionality. Objects 
which models the components are directly 
connected between them by logic operators, 
AND or OR, with which all structure func-
tions is encrypted in a single BDD.   
 
4 Conclusions 
SFTA technique used for allocation software 
reliability is a clear, simple and efficient. IT 
can be used not only at the level of system 
analysis, but also at modules and subsystem 
analysis level.     
Because the construction process of failure 
tree offers a comprehensive understanding of 
the system, it’s been asked from the software 
engineer a better control of relations between 
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the modules, to remove any factor with an 
unsafely potential, so the result of reliability 
to be more rational.  
More, SFTA represents a deductive graphic 
method, describing in a clear way the rela-
tions from the system framework, what 
makes easy the identification process of key 
modules, with the purpose of reliability allo-
cation.     
This paper introduces a new integrated 
framework for software reliability analysis, 
using analysis and modeling techniques:    
-  software failure tree method, SFTA;  
-  binary decision diagram, BDD, for the 
SFTA analysis;  
-  Java evaluation techniques for Java relia-
bility, JReliability  
With the help of Java library, JReliability, we 
could automate the generation of binary deci-
sion diagram for a considered system, after 
applying the SFTA technique. The new 
methodology is simple, efficient, having a 
considerable development factor, limited on-
ly at software engineer knowledge level 
which analyzes the systems reliability.   
Other analysis and modeling approaches 
(Markov model, simulation models) are nec-
essary for the cases in which a system failure 
depends even by the order in which the 
events (errors) appears, and not only by their 
simple combination. 
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